Political Judgments
Samuel Issacharofft
Without doubt, the partisan fires of the last presidential election
still burn too fiercely for retrospective evaluations to have much
chance of standing independent of their outcome-determinative quality. The still smoldering events of the Florida protest and contest
phases continue to shape the positions taken by observers across the
political spectrum. On the left, there are the sudden converts to state
autonomy, unfettered local electoral discretion, the ability of local jurisdictions to proclaim a "do-over" in a national election, and the perfidy of the Electoral College. On the right, the former champions of
states' rights have now embraced federalism in its original nationalist
guise, have become infatuated with the Fourteenth Amendment, and
have learned to love their federal courts as aggressive as they come.
Despite the odds against drawing a successful balance sheet at
this point, there are observations that should be made, and that can be
measured against standards independent of who won and who lost in
Florida. The first point that may be lost amid the partisan ardor is that
the legal system responded remarkably well to tremendous stress. For
over a month, the U.S. underwent what in much of the world would
have been characterized as a succession crisis following the end of an
incumbent's reign. Strikingly, however, throughout this period, there
was essentially no social unrest, no crisis of governance, no inability to
maintain discipline in foreign affairs, no instability in financial markets, no crisis in consumer markets, no stockpiling of goods, and so
forth. Instead, there was a captivating display of high-powered lawyering that seized the national spotlight and resolved what in much of
human history would have been an invitation to disorder and despair.
Much may be argued about the excess of legal regulation of our
society. But it was law and lawyering that allowed a resolution of an
election whose margin of victory proved less than the margin of error
in the electoral system overall. Undoubtedly, there will be many proposals for change of the more ossified electoral practices. But in the
manner of the well-intentioned proposal to move first base back five
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feet-so as to avoid so many close calls at first-so too there will
never be any mass electoral system that will completely escape the
frailties of human design. At the end of the day, law and the popular
faith in the legal process brought an orderly end to the election crisis.
The second point, however, is much less rosy. Although the legal
system brought closure to the process, it did so at a price. Hastily concocted doctrines and resolutions brought the judiciary into the public's political scrutiny as rarely before. Particularly after Bush v Gore,'
the question must be asked, did the Court accomplish anything more
than the delivery of a resolution to the dispute that placed in office
the candidate most in keeping with the Court's philosophical predilections? The fact that law was the instrumentality of resolving disputes
does not of itself establish that the law was well utilized or that its
principles were wisely applied.
Here there is simply no escaping the fact that the Supreme
Court's foray into Election 2000 is the first time that the Court has
pronounced a victor in any election, let alone the most dramatic election of all. Prior to Bush v Gore, the Court categorically eschewed reviewing the outcomes of elections. The Supreme Court was simply not
in the business of providing solace to disappointed office-seekers; in
Justice White's time-honored terms, "As our system has it, one candidate wins, the others lose.' 2 Even when courts had to look at election
outcomes to determine if the system had malfunctioned, they did so
only over the long term to see if "the electoral system is arranged in a
manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters'
influence on the political process as a whole,"3 or if a minority group
had encountered structural obstacles that allowed majority voters
"usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."' And when
called upon to evaluate tensions between state electoral processes and
federal dates for assuming office, the Court showed tremendous solicitude for state practices, including recounts, that were an "integral
part" of state practice and accordingly fell "within the ambit of the
broad powers delegated to the States" by the Constitution.
Certainly, events change, new legal issues require doctrine to be
reformulated, and the facts of the cases just invoked do not precisely
correspond to the events in Florida. But the general tenor of this case
1

121 S Ct 525 (2000) (per curiam).
Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124, 153 (1971) (considering the use of multimember legislative districts).
3
Davis v Bandemer,478 US 109, 155 (1986) (holding that the district court's findings did
not meet the threshold for showing vote dilution).
4
Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 31 (1986) (emphasis added) (considering the use of
multimember districts in legislative apportionment).
5
Roudebush v Hartke, 405 US 15,25 (1972) (lifting a lower federal court's injunction on a
recount proceeding under state law).
2
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law imposes some burden of justification for the Court's unprecedented and swaggeringly confident intervention into Election 2000. In
what follows, I will suggest that the Court may well have been justified
in its desire to expand constitutional scrutiny to cover on-the-run, post
hoc alterations of electoral practices, but that it failed in the preservation of an institutional reticence to intercede in the political thicket
when other institutional actors were amply well positioned to address
the claimed harm. For those keeping score at home, this puts me most
in line with Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, most notably his advocacy of "self-restraint" on the part of the Court.6
To make this assessment, it is necessary to go back to the still festering disputes over the Court's abandonment of the political question
doctrine. Until the breakthrough reapportionment cases of the 1960s,
the Court refused to immerse itself in any claim implicating the political process. In Luther v Borden,7 the Court introduced a prudential
bar on having courts adjudicate contested questions of electoral legitimacy and declined to entertain a challenge between contending
factions claiming to be the rightful governors of Rhode Island. As defined by Justice Frankfurter in invoking caution about entering "the
political thicket," the "Constitution has left the performance of many
duties in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the
executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the
people in exercising their political rights."8
The Court evaded the political question straitjacket in 1962 in
Baker v Carr,' but did so by denying the applicability of a truncated
version of the political question doctrine ° and by invoking curiously

Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 557-58 (Breyer dissenting), quoting United States v Butler, 297
US 1, 79 (1936) (Stone dissenting).
7 48 US (7 Howard) 1 (1849) (addressing a "republican form of government" clause claim
arising from the Dorr rebellion).
8
Colegrove v Green, 328 US 549, 556 (1946) (affirming the dismissal of an action to invalidate certain provisions of state law governing congressional districts).
9 369 US 186 (1962) (relying on the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a state's legislative apportionment scheme).
10 The Court's redefinition was:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
6

Id at 217.
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assumed "[j]udicial standards [that] are well developed and familiar."'"
Baker left to subsequent cases the task of providing guidance for how
courts were to navigate the political shoals, most notably Reynolds v
Sims" and the development of the one-person, one-vote doctrine. As I
have argued elsewhere,'3 the Court in Baker never managed a cogent
explanation of its abandonment of the political question doctrine or of
how courts were to avoid being sullied by immersion into electoral
disputes.
In retrospect, the successful evasion of the political question barrier to judicial review, most notably in the reapportionment context,
required a combination of factors.'" First, and foremost, the Court
needed to articulate a simple and judicially manageable standard for
measuring the constitutional right at stake. This was a critical response
to the challenge from Justice Harlan in Reynolds that "cases of this
type are not amenable to the development of judicial standards."'5 Second, and equally critical, the Court needed clearly to explain why it
should be the institutional actor to provide redress, in effect rising to
answer Frankfurter's invocation in Colegrove of the executive, the legislature, and the people as the repositories of constitutional vindication.'6 This point is compellingly argued in Baker by Justice Clark, who
clearly sets out why the courts were the only source of potential remedy for claims of systemic malapportionment:
Although I find the Tennessee apportionment statute offends the
Equal Protection Clause, I would not consider intervention by
this Court into so delicate a field if there were any other relief
available to the people of Tennessee. But the ... majority of the
voters have been caught up in a legislative strait jacket. Tennessee has an "informed, civically militant electorate" and "an
aroused popular conscience," but it does not sear "the conscience
of the people's representatives." This is because the legislative
policy has riveted the present seats in the Assembly to their respective constituencies, and by the votes of their incumbents a
reapportionment of any kind is prevented. The people have been
rebuffed at the hands of the Assembly; they have tried the constitutional convention route, but since the call must originate in the
11 Idat 226.
12 377 US 533 (1964) (striking down a plan for apportionment not based on population).
13 See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 Tex L Rev 1643, 1647-55 (1993). See also Michael C. Dorf and Samuel Issacharoff, Can ProcessTheory Constrain Courts?,72 U Colo L Rev (forthcoming 2001).
14 1treat this theme more fully in an earlier critical assessment of the Court's willingness to
entertain political gerrymandering claims in Davis v Bandemer, 478 US 109. See Issacharoff, 71
Tex L Rev 1643 (cited in note 13).
15 377 US at 621 (Harlan dissenting).
16 328 US at 556.
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Assembly it, too, has been fruitless. They have tried Tennessee
courts with the same result, and Governors have fought the tide
only to flounder.... We therefore must conclude that the people

of Tennessee are stymied and without judicial intervention will
be saddled with the present discrimination in the affairs of their
state government."
The question then becomes how does Bush v Gore measure up
against this two-part template for successful avoidance of the Court
being ensnared in the political thicket. Has the Court identified a clear
constitutional principle and how it is that it shall be managed judicially? And, has the Court explained why the judiciary is the proper
institutional actor to ford the turbulent political streams?
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN ELECTION PRACTICES

The first question to address is the nature of the constitutional
harm identified in Bush v Gore. There are three different theories put
forward by the Court in Bush v Gore and its immediate predecessor,

Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board.' As an initial matter,

therefore, the political question inquiry requires addressing the clarity
and robustness of the claimed federal constitutional interest.
A. Article II, Section 1
The first claimed harm concerns the source of state law authority
for regulating electoral disputes. This narrow issue turns on the peculiarity of presidential elections given the language of Article II, Section
1 of the Constitution, which provides that electors shall be appointed
"in such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct."'9 In Bush v
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, the Court vacated and re-

manded the Florida Supreme Court's reconfiguration of the Florida
statutory protest and contest phases on the grounds that, "we are unclear as to the extent to which the Florida Supreme Court saw the
Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature's authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. " "2This approach, which ultimately garnered only
three votes in Bush v Gore, provides little basis for a robust approach
to the problem of elections gone bad.'
369 US at 258-59 (Clark concurring) (footnotes omitted).
121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per curiam).
19 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 2.
20
121 S Ct at 475.
21 In his Essay in this Symposium, Richard Epstein makes a strong case for the proposition
that the Florida Supreme Court created new rules of conduct for the election after-the-fact.
17
18
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To begin with, the Court in Bush v Palm Beach County Canvass-

ing Board and Rehnquist's concurrence in Bush v Gore place great
emphasis on the distinction between the acts of the Florida legislature
and the other sources of state law derived either from the state consti-

tution or the principles of equity. Perhaps not since Erie v Tompkins2
overruled Swift v Tyson23 has a decision turned so heavily on the question of the source of state law. Bush v Palm Beach County Canvass-

ing Board suggests that the constitutional delegation of authority in
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution is an exclusive grant of authority to the state legislature to create the procedures for the election
of the state's presidential electors.' The opinion further raises the possibility that no other state law (including the state constitution) may
intercede absent an express delegation of authority from the legislature. If so, the invocation of state constitutional law to cabin the acts
of the state legislature would, by extension, violate the Supremacy

Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
This formal rendition of the source of state law actually accomplishes very little. As matters stood after Bush v Palm Beach County
CanvassingBoard, there still appeared room for the normal operation
of judicial interpretation of statutes. Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board did not entertain the notion that the state legislative
From this he attempts to draw the conclusion that the Article II, Section 1 claim was in fact the
decisive constitutional issue. See Richard A. Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof
May Direct": The Outcome in Bush v Gore Defended, 68 U Chi L Rev 613 (2001). As I will set
out, there are two defects with this approach. First, it proves too much. If the problem is with after-the-fact alterations of electoral processes in a potentially outcome-determinative fashion,
why should this principle be limited to presidential elections alone, subject to Article II, Section
1? Should not the protection of the integrity of the election system correspond to a more central
constitutional command? Second, the claim proves too little. The fact that the Florida Supreme
Court recast the state electoral practices does not in itself mean that a violation of Article II,
Section 1 was present. What if the Florida Supreme Court overturned a legislative enactment
that limited the franchise to only men? Or only white citizens? Does anyone seriously claim that
Article II, Section 1 would be an obstacle to enforcement of the federal constitutional protections of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments?
22 304 US 64 (1938).
23 41 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842).
24 Swift had drawn a sharp distinction between legislative enactments and decisional law
of
the state courts. For Justice Story, the former were true sources of law that federal courts under
the Rules of Decision Act were obligated to follow in construing state law in diversity cases. The
latter were merely interpretive guides that could be subsumed under the federal common law
without doing violence to state law. Id at 9-11.
25 See 121 S Ct at 474. The Court relied for this proposition on its reading of McPherson v
Blacker, 146 US 1 (1892). As discussed in When Elections Go Bad, however, McPherson established only that there could be judicial review of a claim of abridgment of legislative prerogatives
in setting the mechanism for selecting a state's electors. See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. KarIan, and Richard H. Pildes, When Elections Go Bad: The Law of Democracy and the Presidential
Election of 2000 105 (Foundation 2001). Nothing in McPherson purports to limit the constitutional interest in presidential elections solely to Article II, Section 1.
26
Bush v Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard, 121 S Ct at 474-75.

2001]

PoliticalJudgments

scheme would either be fully responsive to any emergency that might
arise, or that it would be entirely self-revealing and consistent. In this
sense, the Court rejected the more extreme argument advanced by the
Bush campaign that any state judicial review or interpretation would
violate the federal constitutional scheme." Bush v Palm Beach County
CanvassingBoard does, however, appear to contemplate that state judicial review of presidential election disputes takes as its cue state legislative enactments rather than state constitutional or common law authority." What remains uncertain is the source of remedial authority of
state courts in the event of a problem in the administration of the
state statutory election system. Thus, the Bush v Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board remand leaves unclear whether the Florida Supreme Court's recasting of the statutory date for certification could
stand if it were based on a conflict in the state election code combined
with the need for redress through emergency court action. The plurality opinion in Bush v Gore adds little to the rationale of the Court in
Bush v Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard.

Perhaps more problematic for this approach, the reliance on Article II, Section 1 entails a curiously cabined view of the federal interest in presidential elections. In light of the expansion of federal oversight of state practices under the Fourteenth Amendment, the treatment of Article II (or the Twelfth Amendment) as the sole source of
constitutional concern in federal elections is curious, and certainly
cannot survive Bush v Gore.For example, if a state legislature decided
to enact a system of election of presidential electors that was based on
a county-unit voting system, or some other basis that violated the requirements of one-person, one-vote, is it conceivable that such a selection mechanism would be unaffected by the equipopulation requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment? Or could a state enact a system
of selecting electors that limited the franchise to men, in derogation of
the Nineteenth Amendment? To ask these questions is to answer
them. It is simply inconceivable that any court would seriously entertain the proposition that the selection of presidential electors stands
apart from other constitutional provisions covering the right to vote,
regardless of whether they are in the form of the text of other provisions of the Constitution or exist in the extensive interpretive case law
of the past century.
Once the scope of federal constitutional oversight of presidential
elections is recognized as sweeping beyond Article II, the power of the
27 See Brief For Petitioner, Bush v Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard,No 00-836, *3637 (filed Nov 28,2000) (available on Lexis at 2000 US Briefs 836).
28 121 S Ct at 473-74.
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Article II approach is significantly vitiated, even as a limitation on
state courts. The objectionable opinion of the Florida Supreme Court
did indeed rely on state constitutional doctrine as the basis for its equitable intervention into the first stages of Election 2000.29 But the
principles drawn from Florida constitutional law were at such a level
of generality that they could as easily have been derived from the basic federal cases establishing the right to vote as a fundamental
rightM-indeed, the very cases the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently
relied upon in crafting the equal protection doctrines of Bush v Gore.
Moreover, in its own opinion on the remand from Bush v Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board,3 the Florida Supreme Court came to pre-

cisely the same ruling as it had initially,3 but was duly chastened from
ever mentioning its own state constitution. To the extent that the constitutional infirmity in Florida turned on the use of state constitutional
law, the Supreme Court's intervention into the Florida election crisis
makes little sense. It is hard to give much credence to a constitutional
principle that treats state constitutional law ultimately as the law that
dare not speak its name.
B.

Retrospective Changes in State Procedures

In the brief window between Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board and Bush v Gore, it appeared that the Court was

searching for a constitutional principle that would look with great
skepticism on after-the-fact alterations of election procedures. Certainly the skeletal rendition of the facts in Florida provided ammunition for such a concern. It was clear, for example, that the Florida Supreme Court's exercise in statutory interpretation in Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board v Harris"was mightily strained and that the

claimed statutory conflict between the "may" and "shall" instructions
to the Secretary of State could have been reconciled in a variety of
ways that required less judicial rewriting of the Florida election code.4
29 See Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris,772 S2d 1220, 1228 (Fla Nov 21,
2000), vacd and remd as, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471.
3 See, for example, Reynolds, 377 US at 561-62 (stating that "[u]ndoubtedly, the right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society").
31 Gore v Harris,772 S2d 1243 (Fla Dec 8, 2000), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct
525.
32
Gore v Harris,772 S2d at 1260-62.
33 772 S2d 1220 (Fla Nov 21,2000), vacd and remd as, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471.
34 The more one examines the Florida statutes, the more inescapable seems the conclusion
that they are inherently defective. Arguably the deadlines in Fla Stat Ann § 102.111 (the "shall"
language) should not apply when a protest has been filed but has not been resolved. The protest
statute specifically grants a right of protest, with a deadline for filing a protest five days after the
election or before certification (at most seven days). There is no deadline for completion of the
protest, but the very last subsection (10) of the statute requires that the Secretary of State re-
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Similarly, there was serious reason for concern in Palm Beach County
where prior county board rules on the counting of the now infamous
dimpled chads were fairly clearly abrogated in the rush to accommodate claims of voter error and defective voting machines in Election
2000." Particularly in light of the peculiar claims for selected recounts

under shifting procedures, the Florida scenario was ripe for claims that
the integrity of the process was being compromised for partisan aims."
The concurring opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted to
construe these alterations of preexisting practices as the core of an Article II, Section 1 violation independent of the earlier reliance on the

Florida state constitution. The difficulty in raising this concern to a
constitutional principle under Article II, Section 1 is that it would appear to proscribe actions taken in nonpresidential elections and alterations undertaken after-the-fact by the state legislature itself. Perspond within three days to a request by the county to verify election software. The existence of
this deadline, on the Department of State no less, could indicate that the legislature contemplated that the protest phase could and probably would take at a minimum eight days, and in any
case could permissibly last longer than the seven day "shall" deadline. Thus, one reading could be
that the "shall" language applies to results that have not been protested. This is further supported by the fact that Section 101.5614(8) specifies that "write-in, absentee and manually
counted results shall constitute the official returns." Fla Stat Ann § 101.5614(8) (West 2000). This
is also quoted by the Florida Supreme Court. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d at 1235. Because the statutory provisions for manual recount are in the protest section, it follows that official returns cannot be calculated until the protest phase (at least when
manual recounts occur) is complete. If they cannot be calculated, they cannot be certified since
Section 101.111 requires that the Canvassing Commission "shall" certify "official" results.
There is however the complication of the penalties provided in Section 102.112 and the
"shall be ignored" clause in Section 102.111. However, the "shall" language of Section 102.111
applies to elections that could have been certified by the county and were not or were and were
not sent to the Secretary of State and the "may" language applies to those that could not have
been certified because of a protest or other delay. Under this reading, the statutory scheme
would appear to be best read to give the Secretary of State discretionary power to determine
whether there would be a meaningful right to protest.
The next statutory difficulty is that the contest phase can begin only after the results are certified and thus on my reading after all manual recounts are complete. See Fla Stat Ann § 102.168
(West 2000). There are no statutory deadlines for the completion of the contest or the protest.
The most aggressive step taken by the Florida Supreme Court was to manufacture from whole
cloth its own deadline by relying on the safe harbor provision of 3 USC § 5 and the right to a
meaningful contest. This is clearly without foundation. See Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board v Harris,772 S2d at 1237. Certainly, this appears nowhere in the statute and since this is
not a statute specific to presidential elections, it would not even come into play in the majority of
elections held pursuant to it. The court cites no legislative history to support its conclusion that
the legislature intended to comply with this deadline.
35 Jeffrey Toobin, Miami Postcard:As Nasty As They Gotta Be, New Yorker 70 (Nov 27,
2000).
36 Hence I do not really take issue with Judge Posner's claim in this symposium that the final effect of the Supreme Court's intervention may have been "rough justice." See Richard A.
Posner, Bush v Gore: Prolegomenonto an Assessment, 68 U Chi L Rev 719 (2001). Judge Posner
leaves aside the question whether the outcome was "legal justice" -but it is that question that
occupies me.
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haps accordingly, the Article II, Section 1 argument was rejected by six
members of the Court and, instead, the question of fidelity to previously enacted electoral procedures was transferred into a reliance on

3 USC § 5 (1994). This now famous statutory provision forecloses con-

gressional challenge to a state's designated electors so long as a "State

shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to [election day], for its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of... electors ... by judicial or other methods...."

It is entirely fair to read 3 USC § 5 as codifying an important
principle of electoral democracy requiring the rules of engagement to
be explicated ex ante and to be fairly immutable under the strain of
electoral conflict. The basic premise is that election officials, who are
most likely partisan figures, cannot be trusted to improvise electoral
remedies once the impact of their decisions is known and the temptation toward self-serving behavior becomes irresistible. Such an approach would have the advantage of fitting in well within a theory of
democratic governance that relies heavily on procedural precommit-

ments to insure fairness.37 It further has the advantage of actually corresponding to a previously developed line of election cases that identifies significant legal interests, both federal and state, that are implicated by manipulations of the rules of elections.38
There are two key drawbacks to the altered procedures standard
for constitutional review. The first is that despite the apparent concern
over such alterations in Bush v Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard,
the Court essentially abandoned this path in Bush v Gore in favor of a
revitalized equal protection approach. The second difficulty is a
managerial one for federal courts. Resting federal constitutional oversight on fidelity to preexisting election procedures necessarily involves
an assessment of what prior procedures were and what alterations
were actually made. Since the conduct of elections is basically entrusted to states, and since states in turn devolve responsibility to
37
For a further explication of this thesis, with particular application to the redistricting
context, see Issacharoff, 71 Tex L Rev at 1661 (cited in note 13). The concept of precommitment
and the political theory of constitutions as precommitment strategies have, at this point, extensive pedigrees. On precommitment, see, for example, Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in
Rationalityand Irrationality37-47 (Cambridge 1979) (discussing precommitment strategies). See
also Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J L, Econ & Org 357 (1985). Other
scholarly works apply precommitment theory to constitutions. See Jon Elster, Intertemporal
Choice and Political Thought, in George Loewenstein and Jon Elster, eds, Choice over Time 35
(Russell Sage 1992); Stephen Holmes, Precommitmentand the Paradoxof Democracy, in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalismand Democracy 195 (Cambridge 1988).
38
The clearest example is from the Roe line of cases in the Eleventh Circuit, dealing with
after-the-fact alterations in counting procedures for absentee ballots in an Alabama local election. See Roe v Alabama,43 F3d 574 (11th Cir 1995). A fuller discussion of the Roe cases and the
constitutional principles underlying them can be found in Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes, When
Elections Go Bad at 15-24 (cited in note 25).

20011

PoliticalJudgments

county level election officials, federal constitutional review of changed
state election procedures would in turn require that every local and

state election procedure be subject to federal judicial scrutiny. Such an
approach would run counter to long-standing abstention doctrines
that would have federal courts step clearly aside when matters of interpreting state law and procedures are inherent to federal questions."

To some extent the groundwork for more invasive federal examination has already been laid. Already, for example, the Supreme Court

in the redistricting context has recast the familiar principle that federal courts should abstain from cases requiring interpretation of state

law to one that they should retain jurisdiction but defer judgment until
the state law issue may be resolved, '° perhaps by certification to the
highest court of the state." The Court may well have realized that the

articulation of a central federal concern in the proper application of
state procedures would set aside all federalism-based considerations

of federal court abstention. A significant step in that direction can be
found in the Eleventh Circuit's treatment of abstention in the direct
federal court challenge to Election 2000:
Our conclusion that abstention is inappropriate is strengthened
by the fact that Plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation of their
voting rights. In considering abstention, we must take into account the nature of the controversy and the importance of the
right allegedly impaired. Our cases have held that voting rights
cases are particularly inappropriate for abstention. In light of this
precedent, the importance of the rights asserted by Plaintiffs
39
These are the well-known Pullman and Burford abstention doctrines. The abstention
doctrine developed in Railroad Commission of Texas v Pullman Co,312 US 496, 501 (1941),
emerges from concern that there should not be premature federal court intervention when ongoing state proceedings might obviate the need for the federal court to act. The abstention doctrine
set forth in Burford v Sun Oil Co, 319 US 315,332-34 (1943), is based on considerations of federalism and comity that require federal courts to resist disrupting the customary procedures of
state law.
40 See Growe v Emison, 507 US 25,32 n 1 (1993):
We have referred to the Pullman doctrine as a form of "abstention." To bring out more
clearly, however, the distinction between those circumstances that require dismissal of a suit
and those that require postponing consideration of its merits, it would be preferable to
speak of Pullman "deferral." Pullman deferral recognizes that federal courts should not
prematurely resolve the constitutionality of a state statute.

(internal citations omitted).
41 In Tunick v Safir,209 F3d 67,73 (2d Cir 2000), Judge Calabresi seized upon a statement
by the Supreme Court that "[c]ertification today covers territory once dominated by a deferral
device called 'Pullman abstention,"' Arizonans for Official English v Arizona, 520 US 43, 75
(2000). Judge Calabresi noted, "The teaching of Arizonans, therefore, is that we should consider
certifying in more instances than had previously been thought appropriate, and do so even when
the federal courts might think that the meaning of a state law is 'plain."' Tunick, 209 F3d at 73.
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counsels against our abstention in this case; although, as discussed below, we are mindful of the limited role of the federal
courts in assessing a state's electoral process.42
The risk in this approach is the federalization of all election law,
akin to the concern a generation ago that the recognition of a due
process interest in employment would constitutionalize all public sector employment law.43 Since all state procedures would trigger a constitutional voting rights concern, either all election challenges would
be immediately reviewable in federal court, or they would linger forever unripe since matters of state law interpretation would inevitably
be present. Perhaps because of the disruption that would be caused to
the law of federal courts, the constitutionalization of altered procedures was another path not chosen by the Supreme Court.
C.

The New Equal Protection
In the scramble to find a suitable constitutional principle on
which to rest its distrust of the Florida events, the Court finally settled
on a sweeping, but rather vague rendition of equal protection. According to the Court:
The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation
of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner
of its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal
terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another.'
In so holding, the Court revived the fundamental rights line of
cases from the 1960s, most notably Reynolds and Harper v Virginia
Board of Elections,5 that had essentially collapsed of its own weight
decades ago. The demise of this equal protection approach was, in
part, the result of the unsuccessful attempt to extend fundamental
rights claims to everything from privacy to wealth distinctions. In part
as well, the fundamental rights line of cases succumbed to the emergence of intent-based equal protection review after Washington v
Davis. ° But part of the blame must also lie with the amorphousness of
Siegel v LePore,234 F3d 1163,1174 (11th Cir 2000) (citations omitted).
See Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341, 349-50 (1976) (Justice Stevens invoking the principle
that the Constitution must not become the vehicle for federalizing all state employment decisions).
44 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 530.
45
383 US 663 (1966) (striking down the poll tax as an abridgment of the fundamental right
to vote).
46 426 US 229 (1976) (holding that the racially disproportionate impact of a written employment test, which was neutral on its face, did not warrant the conclusion that the test was a
purposely discriminatory device).
42
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the claimed fundamental right to vote. Take for example the core constitutional principle relied upon by the Court in Reynolds in formulating the one-person, one-vote rule of apportionment:
[R]epresentative government is in essence self-government
through the medium of elected representatives of the people, and
each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation only as
qualified voters through the election of legislators to represent
them. Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature.
Modern and viable state government needs, and the Constitution
demands, no less."
As evocative as the principle of "full and effective participation"
might be, it remains unclear thirty-five years later what are the precise
parameters of this claimed right.4 When reduced to a manageable doctrine, such as the equipopulation rule of apportionment, courts have
successfully been able to constrain the structural obstacles to participation that were present in cases such as Baker and Reynolds.49 But
how far does "fair and effective participation" extend into campaign
finance, party access to ballots, minority representation, or any of the
other issues that have dominated the law of the political process over
the past decade?
What then is the scope of the Court's newfound equal protection
jurisprudence? Certainly the claim that states have a responsibility to
ensure equality of access to the franchise is welcome. Since the emergence of suspect classifications as the sole effective source of equal
protection redress, and following the development of the post-1982
Voting Rights Act as the most powerful vehicle for judicial intervention in the political arena, there has been a strong incentive to recast
all claims of partisan disadvantage in the judicial arena as claims for
racial redress.0 To the extent that Bush v Gore revitalizes a non-race
377 US at 565.
For a general discussion of this topic, see Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and
Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the PoliticalProcess145-50 (Foundation 1998).
49 The disparities between the largest and smallest populations assigned to a legislative district were 23-to-1 in Baker and 41-to-1 in Reynolds. See Issacharoff, 71 Tex L Rev at 1652 (cited
in note 13).
50 See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993
S Ct Rev 245, 251 (noting that partisan groups "use plaintiffs protected by the [Voting Rights
47

48
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based standard of constitutional protection of rights in the political
process, the resulting diminution in the need to dress up all claims of
wrongdoing in racial garb could be quite welcome. But even so, the
newly articulated equal protection doctrine is dramatically widereaching. The claimed wrong in Florida, the disparity in the standards
for counting contested ballots, pales before other disparities in access
to a meaningful vote, most notably the well-documented failure of
voting machines used in one part, but not in another, of many states,
Florida included. That clearly would fall under the Court's new injunction that states have an obligation "to avoid arbitrary and disparate
treatment of the members" of the electorate."
The difficulty in defining the scope of this new equal protection
right is made all the worse by the Court's disingenuous limiting instruction. Without explanation or doctrinal mooring, the per curiam
opinion suddenly pronounces, "Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election
processes generally presents many complexities,"52 as if by such incantation the Court could restrict the sweeping new equal protection doctrine to the peculiar facts of recount procedures-the classic "good for
this train, and this train only" offer. But without any principled distinction between recounts and any number of other procedures that might
result in "arbitrary and disparate treatment" of different parts of the
electorate, the limiting instruction is either meaningless or reveals the
new equal protection as a cynical vessel used to engage in resultoriented judging by decree.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF COURTS

A. The Availability of Political Redress
The second facet of the political question inquiry is not simply
whether there are clear terms of legal engagement, but whether courts
are the proper institutional actors to repair the perceived constitutional harm. In both Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board

and Bush v Gore, the Court invoked, as part of its rationale in overturning the Florida Supreme Court, the concerns for established procedural orderliness and for clear time frames set forth in the federal
Electoral Count Act." Unfortunately, the Court's invocation of 3 USC
§ 5 raises more questions than it answers.

Act] as stalking horses"); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 Tex L Rev 1705, 1732 (1993) (stating that "the political parties will enlist at least some
members of the relevant groups to advance their views").
51 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 530.
52

Id at 532.
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Electoral Count Act of 1887,24 Stat 373, codified at 3 USC §§ 5-7,15-18 (1994).
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Initially, the Court held up this portion of the Electoral Count
Act as setting forth the federal interest in procedural regularity in the
conduct of elections. That invocation of the federal interest leaves untouched the remedial question of how a breach of the federal interest
should be remedied. Going back to Justice Clark's response to the
Frankfurter/Harlan dissents in Baker and Reynolds, the question must
be asked whether, independent of the substantive federal interest, it is
the courts that should act to provide a politically contentious remedy
in an electoral dispute. The direct inquiry set out by Clark carefully
considered all other potential actors and concluded that the Court
must act only after assessing the failure of all other potential avenues
of redress."
Bush v Gore is entirely lacking in such analysis. The Court presumed that once it found the federal interest, its remedial obligations
followed. 5 In this regard, the Court's reliance on the magic December
12 date for the safe harbor under 3 USC § 5 is particularly ironic. This
statutory provision emerged from a rather deliberate congressional effort to provide for orderly resolution of presidential election controversies in the wake of the hastily-crafted Electoral Commission approach from 1877." A review of this statute, however, reveals that it
carefully reserved to the political branches the key role in resolving
contested presidential elections.
If one looks beyond 3 USC § 5 and examines the statute as a
whole, there is actually a coherent attempt made to place responsibility for resolving contested presidential elections in the domain of politics. Thus, for example, as bizarre as it may sound to contemporary
court-accustomed observers, federal law actually anticipates a potential role for state legislatures: when a state "has failed to make a
choice [of electors to the electoral college] on the day prescribed by
law, the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a
manner as the legislature of such State may direct."'7 More directly, 3
USC § 15 expressly anticipates that there could even be rival sets of
electors each claiming to represent their states--as occurred with the
Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina delegations in 1876. Resolution of such disputes is entrusted to independent determination by
See text accompanying note 17.
Indeed, the expansiveness of that assumption may explain why Justices Ginsburg and
Stevens in dissent so categorically refused to entertain any potential violation of federal law in
the Florida imbroglio.
56 The history of the Electoral Commission and its controversial role in resolving the 1876
Hayes-Tilden election is set forth in Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes, When Elections Go Bad at
96-98 (cited in note 25).
57 3 USC § 2 (1994).
54
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each branch of Congress -with a preference in case of a split between
the House and Senate going to the delegation whose certificates of
appointment bear the signature of the governor of their state of origin.*
Nor was this delegation of dispute resolution authority to the political branches an oversight. Rather this was a considered judgment of
Congress responding to the lessons of the stormy 1876 presidential
election and the need to devise procedures for resolving future contested designations of presidential electors. Congress clearly concluded that such decisions would have an inevitable political cast and
should therefore be kept clearly confined within the political
branches. As set forth in the opening speech by the sponsor of the
Electoral Count Act, Senator Sherman, Congress actually contemplated and rejected a role for the Court akin to the role assumed in
Bush v Gore:
Another plan which has been proposed in the debates at different times, and I think also in the constitutional convention, was to
allow questions of this kind to be certified at once to the Supreme Court for its decisions in case of a division between the
two Houses. If the House should be one way and the Senate the
other, then it was proposed to let the case be referred directly to
the prompt and summary decision of the Supreme Court. But
there is a feeling in this country that we ought not to mingle our
great judicial tribunal with political questions, and therefore this
proposition has not met with much favor. It would be a very
grave fault indeed and a very serious objection to refer a political
question in which the people of the country were aroused, about
which their feelings were excited, to this great tribunal, which after all has to sit upon the life and property of all the people of the
United States. It would tend to bring that court into public odium
of one or the other of the two great parties. Therefore that plan
may probably be rejected as an unwise provision. I believe, however, it is the provision made in other countries."
In place of the Court, the statutory scheme envisioned a different set
of actors. In Election 2000, that would have meant Florida's governor
and its legislature and the newly-elected members of Congress. Note
well that all of the designated actors in this rendition of the drama
would be partisan elected officials. Nothing in the statutory scheme
envisions a role for courts, even if our conception of judicial involve-
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Id § 15.
Counting of Electoral Votes, 17 Cong Rec S 817-18 (Jan 21, 1886) (Sen Sherman).
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ment in the political arena is much more developed than it was over a
century ago when the Electoral Count Act was first devised.
No doubt, this scenario would look to many modern observers
like a pure power grab, a partisan circumvention of orderly legal processes. But why is it either surprising or alarming that an electoral
deadlock should be resolved by political officials and bodies elected
by the same voters? The root cause of the difficulties in Florida was
that the election proved undecisive and given the particular distribution of votes nationwide, the Florida electoral resolution would in turn
decide the national election. Justice Breyer well captures this point:
"However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to resolve difficult electoral disputes, Congress, being a political body, expresses the
people's will far more accurately than does an unelected Court. And
'''
the people's will is what elections are about.
In the heated rhetorical battle of Election 2000, no charge was
bandied about with greater derision than the claim that one or another group of partisans was engaged in partisanship. But it was, after
all, a partisan election that was at stake. It hardly seems an affront to
democratic self-governance to channel the ultimate resolution of a
true electoral deadlock into other democratically-elected branches of
government. All the more, if the alternative were to have judges making ad hoc judgments that further state proceedings might "cast a
cloud" on the "legitimacy" of a Bush election." As expressed by Justice Breyer, "Given this detailed, comprehensive scheme for counting
electoral votes, there is no reason to believe that federal law either
62
foresees or requires resolution of such a political issue by this Court."
The Majoritarian Dilemma

B.

Much of course has changed since the first breach of the political
question wall in the 1960s. We have become properly accustomed to
the role of courts in guarding against fundamental distortions of the
political process, particularly when the distortions serve to lock in in6
cumbents by thwarting political competition, ' or serve to lock out raBush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 556 (Breyer dissenting).
61 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 512, 512 (2000) (application for stay) (Scalia concurring). Lest I
be accused of rehashing partisan views of my own, let me make clear that the likely beneficiary
of reserving matters to the political branches would have been Governor Bush. Were there to
have been rival slates of electors, his would have carried certificates bearing the signature of the
governor of Florida (conveniently his brother), his party commanded control in one house of
Congress, his allies controlled the Florida legislature, and under any number of scenarios, some
combination of these factors would have delivered the presidency to him.
Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 556 (Breyer dissenting).
62
For a discussion of the importance of protecting competition in the political arena, see
63
60
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cial minorities.A Each of these interventions corresponds to a claim
that the election system "is systematically malfunctioning," as formulated by John Hart Ely's pioneering work.' But neither of these forms
of distortions was at work in the procedures by which state and federal elected representatives could have directed the ultimate outcome
of the contested 2000 presidential election.
Comparing the Court's response to Election 2000 to prior interventions into the political arena actually illuminates an unexplored
problem in Bush v Gore. Invariably, the process of judicial review in
the electoral arena gives rise in a particularly acute form to the concern over the countermajoritarian difficulty. After all, every time a
court strikes down an election statute, or every time it calls into question electoral processes, the unelected judiciary substitutes its judgment for that of the democratically elected branches.
There are two distinct theories that justify such judicial intervention into the political arena, and each turns on the incapacity for repair from within. The first is the Carolene Products66 rationale that
identifies the need for judicial intervention to protect the famously
termed "discrete and insular minorities." 67 Of importance here is not
simply that the political process might be infected by prejudice, but
that there is reason to believe that the challenged state practices "restrict[ ] those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.'' In other words, the
process is unable to engage in self-repair because of the particular
outcast quality of the minority.
The second rationale both builds on Carolene Products and extends it to conditions in which the political process has become immune to competitive challenge to the status quo. In cases of such
process failure, denoted primarily by the entrenchment or lockup of
Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politicsas Markets: PartisanLockups of the Democratic Process 50 Stan L Rev 643 (1998).
64 See generally Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes, The Law of Democracy
at 367-545 (cited
in note 48).
65
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust103 (Harvard 1980). According to Ely:
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are choking
off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in ...and the outs will stay
out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to
an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that
minority the protection afforded other groups by a representative system. Obviously our
elected representatives are the last persons we should trust with identification of either of
these situations.
Id.
66
67

68

United States v Carolene Products,304 US 144 (1938).
Id at 152 n 4.
Id.
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political power in the hands of an electorally unshakable group, the
impetus for judicial intervention is greatest. The classic example goes
back to the distortions of political power evident in the fact patterns
of cases such as Baker and Reynolds. In each of these cases a maldistribution of political power because of malapportionment made it impossible for even a majority of voters to dislodge minority rural control over state legislatures.0
What emerges from these rationales, paradoxical as it may sound,
is greater legitimacy to judicial intervention in the political process for
countermajoritarian purposes than when the Court seeks to invoke
the role of protector of majority preferences. The premise of both
Carolene Products and the political process theories that followed is
that intervention is required because an electoral lock on power has
made the system unresponsive to permanent electoral minoritieseven if the protected minority happens to be a numerical majority of
the population, as in Baker and Reynolds. The unexplored flip-side of
this rationale is that there is correspondingly less justification for judicial intervention into the political process for majoritarian aims. This
rationale dovetails with the second part of the Court's response to the
political question demand for abstention from election controversies.
As formulated by Justice Clark in his concurrence in Baker, the predicate for judicial intervention had to be the absence of alternative insti0
tutional actors capable of repairing the claimed harm. In the case of
discrete and insular minorities, or in the case of locked-in political
power structures, presumably no other actor could fit the bill because
of the unresponsiveness of the governing coalition to the claims of injustice by those on the outs politically. But that rationale extends
poorly to electoral majorities, particularly those that control alternative political institutional actors. For such politically engaged majorities, the presumption should be quite the contrary and should begin
with the premise that vindication lies in the political arena.
CONCLUSION

In dissent, Justice Breyer struck an important tone of judicial
modesty. Invoking Alexander Bickel, who termed the proper level of
judicial restraint the "passive virtues," 1 Justice Breyer worried that in
69 The justification for judicial intervention based on the lockup of power through anticompetitive devices is developed at length in Issacharoff and Pildes, 50 Stan L Rev at 643 (cited
in note 63).
70 369 US at 258-59 (Clark concurring).
71 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 111-98 (Yale 2d ed 1986).
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spite of significant federal concerns in the Florida events, the Court
had been insufficiently attentive to the risk of "undermining respect
for the judicial process" as a result of its headlong leap into the electoral battleground.7 2 It is not that the Court cannot enter the domain

of politics, but that there are often compelling reasons why it should
not. The demise of the political question doctrine left the Court with a
warrant to enter the political fray, albeit reluctantly, when the lines of
constitutional engagement were sufficiently clear and when no other
institutional actor could repair the damage. What emerges most
clearly from Bush v Gore is that this Court appears seriously lacking
in the appropriate spirit of reluctance.
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Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 557 (Breyer dissenting).

